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Abstract 
The OECD’s unemployment problem is largely concentrated among low-skilled 
workers. In this paper, four explanations of low-skilled workers’ unemployment are 
examined: wage-setting institutions, employment regulation, globalization, and 
monetary policy. The analysis is based on pooled regressions for 21 affluent 
countries over the period 1991-2006. Our findings provide no support for the 
hypothesis that low-skilled workers’ employment prospects are hindered by legal 
minimum wages or strict employment protection. Likewise, large wage inequality 
does not seem to be a necessary condition for countries to achieve low rates of low-
skilled unemployment. In contrast, investment in active labour market policies pays 
off in form of less low-skilled unemployment. Additionally, low real interest rates are 
associated with significantly less low-skilled unemployment. Hence, low-skilled 
workers’ job prospects seem enhanced by a combination of active labour market 
policies with a monetary policy that allows the economy to fully exploit its growth 
potential. 
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Introduction 
 
The burden of unemployment mainly weighs on the shoulders of low-skilled workers in both Europe 
and North America. In 2006, the unemployment rate in the OECD stood at 10 per cent among the low-
skilled as compared to 5 per cent among the medium-skilled and 4 per cent among the high-skilled 
(OECD, 2008). While there seems to be a general trend towards the disaffection of low-skilled 
workers since the 1970s, large country differences persist within Western Europe. Hence, in 2006, 20 
per cent of low-skilled workers were unemployed in Germany and 12 per cent in Belgium, but less 
than 5 per cent in the Netherlands and Norway (OECD, 2008). Our paper’s objective is to examine the 
determinants of these cross-country differences in the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers. The 
literature in labour economics and comparative political economy proposes a large array of culprits for 
low-skilled workers disproportionate unemployment rate.  
We review and empirically analyze four different sets of explanations. A first set highlights 
wage-setting institutions and more particularly minimum wages and wage inequality. A second set 
emphasizes employment policy design and focuses on unemployment benefits, active labour market 
policies and employment protection legislation. A third set insists on globalization by highlighting the 
role of international trade and labour migration. A fourth and final set recalls the importance of the 
macro-economic context and, more particularly, of monetary policy. 
These different explanations are first discussed and then examined on the macro-level for 21 
economically advanced European and Anglo-Saxon countries. Based on OECD labour market data, 
we analyze the influence of labour market policies and institutions on unemployment rates of low-
skilled workers for 4 four-year periods since German reunification 1991 until 2006. These pooled 
time-series cross-section regressions show no evidence for the hypothesis that low-skilled 
unemployment is fostered by legal minimum wages or by strict employment protection. Likewise, 
higher wage inequality or lower exposition to international trade do not seem to be associated with less 
unemployment among low-skilled workers in the OECD. In contrast, two hypotheses are supported by 
our data. Firstly, investment in active labour market policies seems to pay off in form of lower 
unemployment of low-skilled workers. Secondly, high real interest rates are associated with 
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significantly higher unemployment rates among the low-skilled. Hence, our analysis suggests that low-
skilled workers’ job prospects are enhanced by a combination of active labour market policies at the 
micro-level with a monetary policy that allows the economy to fully exploit its growth potential at the 
macro-level.  
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 1 starts out with a review of different explanations 
accounting for low-skilled unemployment. Section 2 then discusses methodological issues, presents 
the data and shows the actual extent of low-skilled unemployment in the 21 European and Anglo-
Saxon countries of our sample. Section 3 presents the empirical results of our pooled regressions. In 
section 4, these findings are discussed in the light of a few countries’ unemployment experiences over 
the last 15 years. Section 5 concludes by highlighting the implications of our findings for labour 
market policy.  
 
 
Explanations for high unemployment among low-skilled workers 
 
Schematically, explanations of low-skilled workers’ unemployment can be divided into four sets of 
hypotheses, depending on whether their central argument lies on wage-setting institutions, 
employment policy design, globalization, or monetary policy. The theoretical foundations of these 
four sets of explanations shall be outlined in what follows. 
 
 
Wage-setting institutions 
 
Statutory minimum wages have regularly been accused of hampering low-skilled workers’ 
employment prospects. In a perfectly competitive labour market, a minimum wage set above the 
market-clearing level is expected to produce unemployment. The minimum wage’s effect should be 
felt most strongly among the two least productive employment categories: low-skilled and young 
workers. The reasoning is straightforward: if a country’s wage floor exceeds low-skilled workers’ 
productivity – the marginal product of their labour –, employers will not hire them. Minimum wages 
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may thus price low-skilled workers out of the labour market. In this line, Siebert (1997: 45) maintains 
that ‘a country that institutionally prohibits flexible wages at the lower end can be expected to have a 
low percentage of employment in low-paid jobs’ and thus higher low-skilled unemployment. 
Theoretical expectations as to minimum wages’ influence on unemployment become less 
clear-cut once we make admission for firms’ monopsony power. If firms possess some discretion in 
wage-setting – due to imperfect information or workers’ inertia to change jobs – and are thus also 
wage-setters and not only wage-takers, a rise in the minimum wage does not necessarily increase 
unemployment of low-skilled workers (Bassanini and Duval, 2006: 75; Manning, 2003: 347). There 
may thus be a certain degree of non-linearity in the employment response to minimum wages: positive 
effects occur for minimum wages below a certain level, job losses thereafter (OECD, 1998: 44). 
In most OECD countries, the structure of earnings is affected more strongly by collective 
bargaining than statutory minimum wages. Hence, the Scandinavian and German-speaking countries 
as well as Italy do not have a legal minimum wage, but a close-knit web of collective agreements 
setting minimum wages for different occupations and sectors. These wage floors should affect low-
skilled unemployment in the same way as legal minimum wages: A high coverage rate with collective 
agreements moves wage formation away from a market solution and should – in a perfectly 
competitive labour market – threaten low-skilled workers’ employment prospects (Siebert, 1997: 47). 
This argument is closely linked with trade union monopoly power: strong trade unions may push 
wages above market-clearing levels at the cost of lower employment. However, this effect should be 
mitigated if labour movements are dominated by exposed-sector unions, which have an interest in 
containing wage costs in order not to jeopardize the viability of their industries.  
Concerning collective bargaining, theoretical expectations may again be more complicated 
once account is made for nonlinear relationships. Trade union influence on wage formation may 
primarily depend on the structure and coordination of collective bargaining. Thereby, extremes may 
work best: on the one hand, decentralized bargaining at the company level with weak unions may be 
employment-friendly, because it comes close to a market process. On the other hand, very centralized 
and coordinated bargaining across sectors may be beneficial for employment as well, because 
powerful unions act as encompassing organizations and internalize the employment implications of 
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their wage agreements (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Layard et al., 2005). Highly coordinated (and thus 
often centralized) bargaining may even produce better results in terms of real wage restraint and thus 
be more successful in minimizing the influence of adverse supply shocks on unemployment 
(Blanchard, 2006: 46; Kenworthy, 2002: 368; Traxler and Kittel, 2000).  
The detrimental effect of wage-setting institutions is often deduced from arguments focusing 
on skill-biased technical change (SBTC). The crucial argument is that the diffusion of information 
technology favours high skilled personnel over low-skilled labour. While computers substitute for 
low-skilled personnel in routine cognitive and manual tasks, they increase the demand for high-skilled 
employees in problem-solving and creative activities. Hence, SBTC puts pressure on workers situated 
at the lower end of the skill distribution. Whether this pressure translates into higher unemployment 
among low-skilled workers depends on a country’s wage-setting institutions. Where wages are 
flexible, SBTC is not expected to increase unemployment, but should be accommodated through 
higher wage differentials (Krugman, 1994). Where labour markets are highly regulated, the forces 
preventing the prevention of larger earnings’ dispersion would instead result in higher unemployment 
among low-skilled workers (Iversen and Wren, 1998; Scharpf, 2000).  
 
 
Employment policy design 
 
Employment policy is expected to primarily impact on low-skilled unemployment through 
unemployment insurance. Unemployment benefits affect work incentives, the reservation wage and 
labour productivity in multiple ways. On the one hand, more generous benefits increase unemployed 
workers’ reservation wage and thus reduce their search intensity and willingness to accept job offers. 
The probable effect is an increase in unemployment. On the other hand, this negative impact may be 
offset by better job matching: generous unemployment benefits give jobseekers more time to find an 
efficient match and thus both lower the likelihood of subsequent separations and increase work 
productivity (Baccaro and Rei, 2007: 538; Bassanini and Duval, 2006: 60; Gangl, 2004). Whether the 
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detrimental or beneficial effect of generous unemployment benefits prevail is thus an empirical 
question.  
Theoretical expectations are less ambiguous with respect to the impact of benefit duration on 
unemployment. A longer benefit entitlement period lessens jobseekers’ incentive to accept a job 
within a few months after job leave and thus increases the risk of jobseekers becoming trapped in 
long-term unemployment. This risk may be particularly large for low-skilled and young workers 
because of the small net difference between unemployment benefits and expected earnings (Esping-
Andersen, 2000: 74; Nickell and Bell, 1995: 41). 
Moreover, the negative impact of generous unemployment benefits may be offset by active 
labour market programs (ALMP) (Bassassini and Duval, 2006: 75). ALMP are expected to reduce 
unemployment through three channels: firstly, employment services and individual case management 
increase the efficiency of the job search process; secondly, training programs improve unemployed 
workers’ competencies and make them, often combined with hiring subsidies, more attractive to 
prospective employers; thirdly, job search monitoring and enforcement of work tests make the 
unemployed more willing to accept jobs and thus lower their reservation wage (Martin and Grubb, 
2001; OECD, 2005). Hence, ALMP – notably efficient job placement services and training programs – 
are expected to decrease unemployment in general and low-skilled unemployment in particular. 
Finally, several authors consider job protection rules to be at the core of labour market 
rigidities and the European unemployment crisis (Saint-Paul, 2004: 52; Siebert, 1997: 49). During 
demand slumps, dismissal regulations restrict employers’ ability to adjust the workforce. In deciding 
whether to hire new workers, employers will take into account the likelihood that firing costs will be 
incurred in the future. Higher dismissal costs in the form of strict employment protection legislation 
may thus have a negative impact on hiring and push up unemployment. Theoretical predictions 
become more ambiguous if we extend our analysis to an entire demand cycle. Higher employment 
protection decreases hiring rates in periods of rising demand, but reduces dismissals during economic 
downturns (OECD, 2004a: 76). The two effects may cancel each other out with respect to 
unemployment.  
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Still, employment protection may affect job creation through a two-fold impact on wages: on 
the one hand, strict employment protection strengthens the wage bargaining power of employed 
insiders by making them less vulnerable to unemployment. On the other hand, strict job protection 
reduces flows in and out of unemployment and thus increases the share of the long-term unemployed. 
Since firms do not consider these latter as valid substitutes for the employed, long-term unemployment 
affects wage formation only marginally and leads to a higher equilibrium unemployment. 
 
 
International trade and migration 
 
Rising international trade, in particular with emerging economies, may have weakened the labour 
market position of low-skilled workers in OECD countries. According to schoolbook economics, 
developed countries that are well endowed with skilled labour have a comparative advantage in the 
production of goods requiring a highly educated workforce. In contrast, developing countries that are 
well endowed with unskilled labour have a comparative advantage in the production of goods that 
make intensive use of less educated workers. Consequently, increased international trade between 
developed and developing countries may hamper the employment prospects of low-skilled workers in 
the OECD countries (Wood, 1995).   
Another aspect of globalization is increased labour migration. Immigrants augment a 
country’s labour supply and may thus increase competition for jobs (Borjas et al., 1997). Guest 
workers  may reduce native workers’ employment opportunities under the assumption that these two 
groups are substitutes in production. This assumption is not unrealistic for low-skilled workers: in 
some sectors and occupations, low-skilled native and low-skilled immigrant labour may come close to 
being interchangeable. Hence, a large influx of immigrants may – if wages do not rapidly adjust 
downwards – increase a country’s low-skilled unemployment rate. 
However, expectations are less clear-cut if immigration is analyzed within a macro-economic 
context. Explanations focussing on the economy’s demand-side insist on the fact that immigration 
increases population and thus also leads to higher demand for goods and services and more jobs. 
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Unemployment should thus only rise if the displacement effect due to a larger pool of low-skilled 
labour is not compensated by a simultaneous increase in aggregate demand. Explanations insisting on 
the economy’s supply-side even attribute immigration a positive impact on jobs: By amplifying labour 
supply, work immigrants increase an economy’s productive capacity and thus enable it to grow faster 
and longer without running into inflationary pressures (Bentolilla et al., 2008).1 Accordingly, the 
theoretical expectations as to the impact of immigration on employment differ widely.  
 
 
Monetary policy 
 
A last explanation focuses on macro-economic policy and aggregate demand management. Unskilled 
workers are particularly sensitive to the economic context. This is due to two advantages that skilled 
workers possess over unskilled workers. Firstly, skilled workers can do many of the unskilled jobs. 
Secondly, they possess specific skills and are thus more costly to replace. In a cyclical downturn and 
the associated fall in demand for labour, firms thus have an interest in ‘hoarding’ skilled workers. This 
means that the burden of adjustment is shifted to lower educated workers, who are more easily 
replaced than skilled workers once the recession is over (Nickell and Bell, 1995: 41; Gautier et al., 
2002). During a recession, unskilled workers are thus the first to be laid-off and the last to be 
reemployed.  
If a recession lasts several years, low-skilled workers’ cyclical unemployment may lead to 
structural unemployment. This persistence of cyclical unemployment – termed hysteresis by 
Blanchard and Summers (1986) – operates through the phenomenon of long-term unemployment. A 
slump in aggregate demand that lasts too long increases the number of long-term unemployed, whose 
job perspectives become increasingly grim as they face human capital devaluation, become 
stigmatized by potential employers and reduce their search activity as a result of repeated setbacks 
(Ball, 1999). Cyclical unemployment is caused by a slump in aggregate demand which, in turn, is 
closely linked to monetary policy: Restrictive monetary policy in the form of high real interest rates 
depresses investment and consumption. Accordingly, an extended period of weak aggregate demand – 
caused, for example, by high or only slowly falling real interest rates – may not just increase current 
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unemployment of low-skilled workers, but through the link with long-term unemployment, also their 
equilibrium unemployment (Baccaro and Rei, 2007: 540; Ball, 1999). The central banks’ setting of 
interest rates may thus have long-lasting effects on the labour market (Blanchard, 2005; Fitoussi et al., 
2000). 
 
  
Data and evidence for low-skilled unemployment 
 
These theoretical expectations are tested for 21 affluent OECD countries. Our sample consists of the 
15 countries making up the European Union (EU) prior to the 2004 and 2007 enlargement rounds, plus 
the two Western European countries outside EU, Norway and Switzerland, and the four extra-
European Anglo-Saxon countries Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. For these 
countries, we examine the link between institutions and low-skilled unemployment for a sixteen-year 
period after German reunification, 1991–2006. Table 1 shows how the different explanations outlined 
above are translated into quantitative variables and gives an overview of the data.2 
 
About here table 1 
 
A few words are needed to shed light on our dependent variable: the unemployment rate of 
unskilled workers. Some scholars suggest that the employment rate is a more meaningful indicator 
(Bradley and Stephens, 2007: 1489; Scharpf, 2000). We do not share this view. Comparatively low 
employment rates may not necessarily imply poor labour market health, but be partly due to – 
culturally and politically determined – married women’s labour force participation. In contrast, high 
unemployment rates unambiguously point to the unsatisfactory functioning of the labour market 
(Kenworthy, 2002: 372). Moreover, unemployment is of much greater relevance for people’s 
individual wellbeing than is employment per se: micro-level evidence suggests that moves between 
work and unemployment have a much greater negative impact on people’s life satisfaction than moves 
between work and inactivity (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998: 70). Not surprisingly then, 
governments keen to be re-elected fear high unemployment rates much more than low employment 
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rates. Hence, there are theoretical reasons why we prefer unemployment over employment rates. 
However, empirically, this question is of lesser relevance as the two indicators are strongly correlated: 
in 2006, the correlation coefficient between low-skilled unemployment rates and low-skilled 
employment rates in 29 OECD was -0.82.  
We focus on low-skilled unemployment with the argument that affluent countries’ 
unemployment problem mainly afflicts low-skilled workers. The argument’s empirical basis is shown 
in table 2, displaying for the 21 countries in our sample the average unemployment rate of low-skilled, 
medium-skilled and high-skilled workers over the four-year period 2003-2006.3 Besides giving a feel 
for the data, this table also shows that unemployment is much lower among workers with secondary 
and, above all, tertiary education than among unskilled workers. In 9 out of the 21 countries analyzed, 
the high-skilled unemployment rate is less than 3 per cent: in these countries, unemployment policy is 
primarily about how to get the low- and medium-skilled back to work. Even more so, unemployment 
is a problem mainly plaguing the low-skilled in Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In these countries, the unemployment rate among both the 
medium and high-skilled stands at 3.5 per cent or less. 
 
About here table 2 
 
If we express the low-skilled unemployment rate as a multiple of the high-skilled 
unemployment rate, it clearly emerges that the low-skilled are comparatively more vulnerable in the 
labour markets of the Continental European countries. Here, they are 3.2 (Austria and Belgium) to 3.7 
(Germany) times more likely to be unemployed than the high-skilled. The disparity between the low-
skilled and the high-skilled unemployment rate is also substantial in the two Anglo-Saxon countries 
U.S. (where the ratio is 3.2) and Ireland (ratio of 2.7). In comparison, the gap in unemployment rates 
between low-skilled and high-skilled employees is somewhat smaller in the Scandinavian and, above 
all, the Mediterranean countries where the ratio of low-skilled over high-skilled unemployment 
amounts to 1.5 or less. 
When looking at the evolution of low-skilled unemployment over time (1991-2006), four 
periods can be distinguished. During the post-reunification recession 1991-1994, unemployment of 
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low-skilled workers in our country sample increased from 9 to 11.4 per cent. It then remained at 
comparatively high 11 per cent during the years 1994-1997 when European governments prepared for 
entry into the Euro-area. When the upswing finally set in, 1997-2001 brought a substantial fall in low-
skilled unemployment averaged across our country sample from 11 to 7 per cent. It then remained at a 
slightly higher level of 8 per cent during the last period 2001-2006.  
 
 
Results of pooled regressions 
 
We examine the impact of institutions and policies on low-skilled unemployment by estimating pooled 
time-series cross-section regressions. Since labour market institutions display very little variation over 
time, there is little point in looking at year-to-year movements (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000: C19; 
Kenworthy, 2007: 348). Instead, we divide our time period into 4 four-year subperiods: 1991-1994, 
1995-1998, 1999-2002, 2003-2006. Having 21 countries in our sample, this leaves us with 84 
observations.4 Dealing with pooled data, we need to account for the fact that observations from within 
a country are not independent. Not only institutions, also unemployment rates are sticky over time. We 
correct for this correlation within the observations of each country by calculating robust OLS-
regressions with Huber-White standard errors (see Breen, 2005: 131). 5 
In our analysis, we follow Kenworthy’s (2007: 345) recommendation for independent-variable 
centred research and start out with a series of very simple models where we enter, alongside a time-
period control variable, only one explanatory variable at a time. These regressions on the low-skilled 
unemployment rate are shown in table 3. We briefly comment the results for each of the four sets of 
explanations, starting out with wage-setting institutions. Our data provide no evidence for a 
detrimental impact of countries’ minimum wage levels on low-skilled unemployment: the coefficient 
has the opposite sign and is not statistically significant. This result is not surprising: Cross-country 
studies regularly find minimum wages in the OECD to be set at too low a level to affect employment 
of prime age adults (Bassanini and Duval, 2006; Layard et al., 2005; OECD, 1998; OECD 2003). In 
most countries, collective bargaining is more consequential for wage-setting. However, over the 
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period since 1991, our relatively crude measures of bargaining coverage and bargaining coordination 
are not associated, one way or the other, with low-skilled unemployment. We obtain the same result 
for union density: low-skilled unemployment seems not fuelled by high union density. This may be 
due to the fact that high union density tends to be linked with coordinated wage bargaining. While we 
do not find evidence for such a link (see regression results in table A.1 in the annex), studies based on 
data for earlier periods suggest that coordination of wage bargaining has a significant downward 
impact on unemployment (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Bassanini and Duval, 2006) and thus cancel 
out the potentially detrimental influence of union density on unemployment (OECD, 2004b; Baccaro 
and Rei, 2007). Finally, we find a significant relationship between wage dispersion and low-skilled 
unemployment. However, it runs counter to the theoretical expectation: countries and periods with 
greater wage differentials are not associated with less, but more unemployment among low-skilled 
workers. This correlation is primarily due to the three Scandinavian countries Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden plus the Netherlands, which have the most compressed wage structure in our sample and also 
feature low rates of low-skilled unemployment over the period under study.   
When turning to the explanations focussing on employment policy design, we find no 
significant link between the OECD index of employment protection strictness and low-skilled 
unemployment. This result is in line with previous studies reporting that job protection legislation 
strongly influences a country’s mix of employment between regular contracts, temporary contracts and 
self-employment, but does not affect the level of unemployment (Bassanini and Duval, 2006; Layard 
et al., 2005; OECD, 2004a). In the same vein, we find no significant relationship between the two 
measures of unemployment benefits (the 1-year and 5-year replacement rates) and low-skilled 
unemployment. The finding that unemployment insurance generosity – the replacement rate during the 
first year after layoff – does not increase unemployment has been reported before (Baccaro and Rei, 
2007; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell and van Ours, 2000). Less expected is the absence of a 
link between low-skilled unemployment and long-term unemployment benefits. Benefit duration has 
regularly been singled out as one of the main culprits of persistent European unemployment (Ball, 
1999: 207; Esping-Andersen, 2000: 79). 
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About here table 3 
 
An explanation of low-skilled unemployment strongly supported by our data is spending on 
active labour market programs (ALMP).6 Attributing a larger share of GDP to ALMP (for a given rate 
of unemployment) seems to go along with consistently lower unemployment rates among the low-
skilled. This beneficial impact of ALMP possibly explains why we do not find a detrimental influence 
for unemployment benefits: States with comparatively generous unemployment insurances such as the 
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands or Switzerland also spend more in terms of GDP on ALMP. 
However, if we introduce the measures for 1-year and 5-year unemployment benefits into a regression 
alongside spending on ALMP, the latter remains strongly correlated with low-skilled unemployment. 
In contrast, unemployment benefit levels still do not seem to matter (see table A.1 in the annex). 
The third set of explanations focusing on globalization receives mixed empirical support. 
During the period under study, there is no significant correlation between trade openness and low-
skilled unemployment. Low-skilled workers are not more likely to be unemployed in countries and 
periods with more pervasive international trade than in economically more sheltered countries and 
periods. On the contrary, the regression coefficient (albeit not significant) suggests that high levels of 
trade openness are associated with better results in terms of low-skilled unemployment. A similar 
result is found with respect to migratory openness: higher levels of labour migration are significantly 
correlated with lower unemployment among low-skilled worker. This seemingly paradoxical finding 
of countries with a strongly positive migratory balance having less low-skilled unemployment is 
probably best explained by reverse causality: countries with thriving labour markets offer better job 
prospects and thus attract more immigrants than countries with high unemployment (Blanchflower et 
al., 2007).7  
Finally, the fourth explanations emphasizing monetary policy is clearly supported by our 
empirical evidence: Countries and periods with higher long-term interest rates are linked to 
significantly higher rates of low-skilled unemployment. Our finding is consistent with the argument 
made by Fitoussi et al. (2000: 260) that monetary policy in Continental Europe increased 
unemployment for most of the 1990s, for reasons having to do with the EMU, the Maastricht Treaty, 
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and the tight-money policies instituted by the Deutsche Bundesbank to offset expenditure for German 
unification. After having fallen in disgrace in the 1980s and early 1990s, explanations of 
unemployment that emphasize demand-side factors seem to gain centre-stage again (see Ball, 1999; 
Blanchard, 2005; Solow, 2000). One important question about monetary policy remains unanswered: 
do high interest rates only affect cyclical unemployment or do they end up – if they remain high for 
too long a period – in increasing structural unemployment as well? Neoclassical theory pleads for the 
former interpretation. Cross-country empirical evidence points to the latter conclusion (Ball, 1999; 
Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). What is undisputed is that macroeconomic conditions are always 
filtered by labour market institutions. Except in non-existing textbook countries where prices and 
wages are perfectly flexible and adjust over night, negative shifts in aggregate demand always have an 
influence on jobs, leading to more or less deep scars in employment depending on a country’s labour 
market institutions (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Fitoussi et al., 2000).  
Accordingly, we estimate a further regression in which we integrate all explanatory variables 
together with real interest rates.8 This allows us to determine the impact of an institution, having 
controlled for the tightness of monetary policy. The results shown in table 4 suggest that even if we 
control for real interest rates, the different measures of wage-setting (union density and bargaining 
coverage) and employment policy (unemployment benefits and job protection) do not significantly 
affect low-skilled unemployment. The two only determinants significantly linked with the 
unemployment rate of low-skilled workers are spending on active labour market programs and real 
interest rates. The same two factors have been singled out by Kenworthy (2003: 1195) as the 
determinants explaining cross-country variation in employment growth.  
In a last regression (model 2 in table 4), we estimate the joint impact of these two measures on 
low-skilled unemployment. A look at the models’ explanatory power indicates that spending on 
ALMP and real interest rates explain about a quarter of variation in low-skilled unemployment across 
OECD countries between 1991 and 2006. The relative impact of both determinants on low-skilled 
unemployment is sizeable: The coefficient for interest rates indicates that a rise of one percentage 
point in long-term real interest rates increases the unemployment rate among low-skilled workers by 
one percentage point. It reminds us that disinflation policies – the tightening of monetary conditions – 
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are costly in terms of unemployment (see Ball, 1999). The coefficient for ALMP suggests that an 
increase in spending on ALMP by 10 per cent (for a given GDP and unemployment rate) reduces the 
low-skilled unemployment rate by one percentage point. 
 
About here table 4 
 
We run two robustness checks for these results. Firstly, we test for outliers by using the 
‘Jackknife’ resampling technique which consists in dropping each country one at a time from our 
regression. Results from these regressions (shown in table 4) show that our findings are not driven by 
a single country: no matter which country we exclude from the regression, the association between 
real interest rates and ALMP on the one hand and low-skilled unemployment on the other remains 
statistically significant. Secondly, we examine whether the effect of ALMP and real interest rates 
holds true if the dependent variable is total unemployment instead of low-skilled unemployment (see 
table A.1 in the annex). The theory predicts that real interest rates – through its link with aggregate 
demand – are as relevant for total unemployment as for low-skilled unemployment. In contrast, active 
labour market programs are often specifically targeting the difficult-to-place unemployed and should 
thus be of greater relevance for low-skilled than total unemployment. The regression results show that 
interest rates and ALMP significantly affect total unemployment. However, as expected, the impact of 
ALMP spending is larger in reducing low-skilled than total unemployment.  
 
 
Discussion of findings 
 
We examine the plausibility of our findings by discussing them in the light of a few countries’ 
unemployment experience since 1991. When looking at real interest rates, two very different cycles 
can be distinguished. In the early 1990s, restrictive monetary policy was one of the main causes for 
large unemployment increase in Western Europe. Between 1990 and 1992, most European countries 
had already entered into recession, whereas Germany’s economy still soared as a consequence of the 
positive demand shock induced by reunification. When the German central bank finally put an end to 
the inflationary reunification boom in 1992 by raising the interest rate, the other European countries 
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had to follow suit to avoid capital outflow and to stabilize their exchange rates. This further depressed 
aggregate demand and resulted in rising unemployment (Fitoussi et al., 2000: 260). Particularly hard 
hit was Sweden, where the real interest rate increased from 4.4 in 1990 to 9 per cent in 1992. This 
disinflation resulted in a gradual increase in Sweden’s low-skilled unemployment from 2.6 in 1991 to 
10.1 per cent in 1995. 
At the end of the 1990s, monetary policy changed from being an impediment to becoming a 
stimulus for employment growth in a number of European countries. In terms of real interest rates, the 
transition to the common European monetary policy in 1999 was particularly beneficial for the 
Mediterranean Euro-countries plus Ireland. Thanks to the common European currency, these countries 
profited after 1999 from the same nominal interest rate as Germany, while still having somewhat 
higher inflation. Hence, Ireland’s real interest rate remained below 1 per cent in the four consecutive 
years after the introduction of the Euro 1999-2002. Over the same period, Ireland’s low-skilled 
unemployment rate decreased 9.2 to 5.9 per cent. Monetary policy also plays a substantial role in 
explaining Spain’s success in bringing down low-skilled unemployment (see figure 1). In the run-up to 
EMU 1990-1996, Spanish real interest rates stood at an annual average of 6.0 per cent. Once in the 
EMU, real interest rates fell to an average of 0.5 per cent over the period 2000-2006. This 
expansionary monetary policy stimulated internal demand (particularly construction) and was essential 
for the reduction of low-skilled unemployment from 17 per cent in 1998 to 9 per cent in 2006. 
 
About here figure 1 
 
What about the role of active labour market policies (ALMP)? In the 1990s, several countries 
overhauled their public employment services with the goal of improving the matching process 
between job seekers and firms. The reforms simultaneously aimed at giving the unemployed better 
job-search assistance and at tightening the conditions that apply to receive benefits. Denmark and 
Netherlands were the two EU-countries making greatest efforts to implement ALMP. In labour market 
reforms of the 1990s, both countries launched the principle of early activation of the unemployed: 
Alongside stricter job-search monitoring and the obligation of program participation, this implied 
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ensuring that every jobseeker gets offers of work or training within a year of becoming unemployed. A 
look at low-skilled unemployment rates suggests that this investment in ALMP was money well spent. 
Between 1990 and 2000, Denmark almost tripled the share of GDP spent on ALMP per unemployed. 
Over the same period, the low-skilled unemployment rate decreased from 14.2 (1991) to 6.9 per cent 
(2000) and remained at or below this level for the following six years. Likewise, figure 2 shows that 
the increase on ALMP spending per unemployed also went hand in hand with significantly less low-
skilled unemployment in the Netherlands. The greater reliance on active measures has been found to 
be the decisive determinant, alongside increased wage coordination (Visser, 1998), of the spectacular 
reduction in Dutch unemployment since the mid-1980s (Nickell and van Ours, 2000: 166).  
 
About here figure 2 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has started out from the observation that the OECD’s unemployment problem concerns, to 
a large extent, low-skilled workers. Accordingly, the objective has been to review and test different 
hypotheses as to the causes of low-skilled unemployment: wage-setting institutions, employment 
policy design, globalization and monetary policy. The results of a series of pooled regressions for 21 
OECD countries give us an indication as to what is related – and, above all, what is not related – to 
unemployment among low-skilled workers.  
Particularly noteworthy is the absence of an empirical link with unemployment for three 
institutions. Firstly, the data provide no support for the hypothesis that strict employment protection 
goes along with higher unemployment among the low-skilled. Secondly, we find no evidence for the 
assumption that low-skilled unemployment is linked to the level of legal minimum wages. Thirdly, 
this result is further substantiated by the finding that higher wage inequality is not associated with less 
unemployment among low-skilled workers – if anything, the contrary applies. Our data thus indicate 
that large wage differentials are not a necessary condition for countries to obtain low unemployment 
among the low-skilled. Added to the missing empirical link between legal minimum wages and 
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unemployment, this result throws serious doubt on the frequently echoed expectation that post-
industrial economies can only achieve full employment if they open their wage structure downwards 
in order to create low-paid service jobs (Krugman, 1994; Siebert, 1997, Scharpf, 2000). The insistence 
on greater wage differentials for the solution of the modern ‘service trilemma’ seems exaggerated 
(Iversen and Wren, 1998).9 
While these results are in stark contrast with the recommendations that Europe’s 
unemployment problem should be resolved through a reduction in minimum wages, an increase in 
wage dispersion and a weakening of job protection (Siebert, 1997; St. Paul, 2004), they confirm the 
findings made by Stephen Nickell and Richard Layard ten years ago: ‘time spent worrying about strict 
labour market regulations, employment protection and minimum wages is probably time largely 
wasted’ (1999: 3029). In view of these results, the vehemence with which many economists and state 
officials insist on the necessity to deregulate the labour market is all the more surprising, as these 
reforms – while probably not very efficient – are socially highly divisive (Solow, 2000: 13).   
We conclude our paper by discussing the two hypotheses that receive support from our data. 
Firstly, investment in ALMP seems to pay off in form of lower unemployment of low-skilled workers. 
Secondly high real interest rates over an extended period are associated with significantly higher 
unemployment rates of low-skilled workers. Hence, the combination of efficient job services, training 
programs and job-search controls with a monetary policy that allows the economy to fully exploit its 
growth potential seems to lead to lower unemployment of the low-skilled.10 A good labour market 
outcome may thus be the result of the coordinated use of instruments on the micro- and macro-
economic level. On the micro-economic level, a strong nexus between active labour market policies 
and the unemployment benefit system seems to contribute to enabling people to move from welfare to 
work (Nickell and Layard, 1999). On the macro-economic level, monetary policy should be used to 
support aggregate demand to shorten recessions. Its role is thus to avoid a persistent rise in 
unemployment (hysteresis) and, more generally, to take advantage of opportunities to expand the 
economy whenever inflationary pressure is weak (Solow, 2000: 9). In other words, ALMP seems an 
efficient micro-economic measure to make sure that jobseekers are willing to work, while expansive 
monetary policy creates a macro-economic context which effectively enables jobseekers to find work.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Variable descriptions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Operationalization of variable Mean Min. Max Source 
Low-skilled unemployment Unemployment rate of workers with less than upper secondary education 9.0 2.1 19.6 OECD 
Legal minimum wage* Legal minimum wage as % of median wage 
of full-time workers 47.1 29.4 62.5 OECD 
Bargaining coverage rate Percentage of employees covered with 
collective bargaining 70.7 14.0 98.0 OECD 
Bargaining coordination* Wage-setting coordination index developed by L. Kenworthy 3.1 1.0 5.0 Kenworthy (2000) 
Trade union density* Percentage of employees organized in a trade union 37.5 9.6 83.0 OECD 
Wage inequality Earnings inequality: ratio of 5th to 1st decile earnings of full-time workers 1.6 1.3 2.5 OECD 
Initial unemployment 
benefit replacement rate 
Initial net replacement rate as percentage of 
net earnings 63.4 34.0 86.0 OECD 
Five-year unemployment 
benefit replacement rate 
Unemployment insurance averaged over a 
five-year period 31.1 9.6 63.7 OECD 
Active labour market policy 
(ALMP)* 
Spending on ALMP as % of GDP, divided 
by unemployment rate 13.1 1.8 62.7 OECD 
Employment protection 
legislation 
OECD indicator of strictness of 
employment protection legislation 2.1 0.2 4.1 OECD 
International trade* Trade openness ratio: sum of exports and imports divided by GDP  78.3 20.7 268.7 OECD 
Labour migration* Yearly average net migration per 1000 population 3.6 -1.2 10.7 OECD 
Real long-term interest 
rates* 
Annual long-term nominal interest rate 
(yield of a 10-year benchmark government 
bond) minus annual GDP deflator 
3.9 -0.5 8.6 OECD 
* To capture the lagged effect of institutions and policies on employment, measures for these variables were averaged over a four-year period pre-lagged by one year with 
respect to the dependent variable.  
Source: OECD indicators are taken from the OECD online-database (http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/default.aspx) 
Table 2: Mean unemployment rate of different skill levels, 2003-2006 (in %) 
 
Low-skilled 
unemployment 
Medium skilled 
unemployment  
High-skilled 
unemployment 
Ratio of low- 
to high-skilled 
unemployment  
Australia 6.3 3.8 2.7 2.4 
Austria 8.0 3.7 2.5 3.2 
Belgium 11.8 6.8 3.7 3.2 
Canada 10.0 6.0 4.7 2.1 
Denmark 6.7 4.0 4.0 1.7 
Finland 10.8 7.8 4.2 2.6 
France 10.8 6.6 5.4 2.0 
Germany 19.6 10.6 5.3 3.7 
Greece 7.7 9.4 6.6 1.2 
Ireland 6.0 3.1 2.2 2.7 
Italy 7.9 5.3 5.3 1.5 
Luxembourg 4.8 3.3 3.3 1.4 
Netherlands 5.2 3.5 2.6 2.0 
New Zealand 3.6 2.5 2.6 1.4 
Norway 5.0 3.0 2.2 2.2 
Portugal 6.8 6.1 5.0 1.4 
Spain 10.1 8.3 6.6 1.5 
Sweden 7.1 5.5 4.2 1.7 
Switzerland 6.9 3.4 2.7 2.6 
United Kingdom 5.3 3.4 2.2 2.4 
United States 9.4 5.3 2.9 3.2 
Sample mean 8.1 5.3 3.9 2.2 
Source: own computation based on OECD (2008) 
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Table 3: Regression results of the effect of a given institution or policy on the low-skilled 
unemployment rate in 21 OECD countries, 1991-2006 
 
  Coef. Std. err. R² N obs. 
Wage-setting institutions Legal minimum wage -12.01 12.300 0.155 48 
 Bargaining coverage rate 0.02 0.027 0.066 74 
 Bargaining coordination -0.57 0.497 0.088 57 
 Trade union density -0.00 0.038 0.045 84 
 Wage inequality 4.08† 2.031 0.148 64 
Employment policy design Initial unemployment benefit 
replacement rate 
-0.04 0.042 0.067 83 
 
Five-year unemployment 
benefit replacement rate 
-0.01 0.044 0.060 81 
 Active labour market policy -11.3** 3.470 0.132 84 
 
Employment protection 
legislation 
-0.22 0.679 0.058 78 
Globalization International trade -0.02 0.013 0.097 84 
 Labour migration -0.53* 0.195 0.165 83 
Monetary policy Real long-term interest rates 1.20** 0.366 0.186 82 
Significant at: † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Note: coefficients have been estimated with OLS-regressions using robust Huber-White standard errors. All the 
regressions include a control variable for the time period (coefficient not shown). 
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Table 4: Regression results of the determinants of low-skilled unemployment rate, 1991-2006 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 (jackknife)° 
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Trade union density -0.00 0.032     
Bargaining coverage 0.02 0.052     
Initial unemployment benefit 
replacement rate 
0.03 0.055     
Five-year unemployment 
benefit duration 
0.02 0.057     
-7.38** 2.181 
Active labour market policy -16.16* 5.821 -10.06** 3.272 
-10.96** 3.576 
Employment protection 
legislation 
-0.40 1.141     
International trade .01 0.017     
0.90* 0.376 
Real long-term interest rates 
1.05** 0.354 1.04* 0.378 
1.27* 0.328 
Time-period 0.65 0.783 0.68 0.743   
Constant 1.63 3.672 4.62 3.511   
N observations 70 82 78 
R squared 0.336 0.251 0.223 
0.293 
Significant at: † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
See notes below table 3. 
° Jackknife regressions show the range of coefficients (extreme values) in regressions with one country omitted 
at a time.  
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Annex 
 
Table A.1: Table 4: Regression results on the determinants of (low-skilled) 
unemployment1991-2006 
 
Dependent variable Low-skilled 
unemployment rate 
Low-skilled 
unemployment rate 
Total unemployment 
rate 
 Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. 
Trade union density 0.02 0.046     
Bargaining coverage 
-0.67 0.554     
Initial unemployment benefit 
replacement rate 
  
0.01 0.058 
  
Five-year unemployment 
benefit duration 
  
0.07 0.059 
  
Active labour market policy   
-16.50* 6.217 -9.96† 5.065 
Real long-term interest rates     0.77* 0.293 
Time-period 
-1.14* 0.480 -0.84* 0.380 0.19 0.564 
Constant 13.54** 2.001 10.68** 3.100 5.26 3.337 
N observations 57 80 82 
R squared 0.093 0.196 0.269 
Significant at: † p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
See notes below table 3. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: real interest rates and low-skilled unemployment in Spain (1991-06) 
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Figure 2: ALMP spending and low-skilled unemployment in the Netherlands (1991-06) 
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1
 Immigration is thus expected to decrease the NAIRU (the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment). Bentolilla et al. (2008) argue that Spain’s substantial fall in unemployment between 
1995 and 2006 could only be achieved without high inflation because the country witnessed an 
immigration boom over the same period.  
2
 The dataset is available from the author and can be obtained by e-mail.  
3
 Low-skilled refers to people who did not complete upper secondary education (either vocational or 
general). Medium-skilled refers to people with upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
education, but without a tertiary degree. Finally, high-skilled refers to people with tertiary education 
(OECD, 2008).  
4
 Inevitably, there are a few missing country observations for most variables. In the case of legal 
minimum wages, this is due to the fact that in several countries they do not exist. Values of the 
bargaining coordination index developed by Kenworthy (2000) only exist up to 2000. 
5
 This is done by using Stata’s “cluster” subcommand. Robust regressions with Huber-White standard 
errors account for the fact that observations are independent between countries, but not within 
countries across periods. This estimator is preferable to alternatives based on random-effects models. 
These latter rely on the (unrealistic) assumption of random distribution of observations within the 
same country over time.  
6
 Footnote ALMP: Following the OECD, we count as active measures public employment services, 
labour market training, youth measures, subsidised employment and measures for the disabled. 
7
 Moreover, in countries with a tradition of immigration, labour supply probably reacts more quickly 
to cyclical slumps in labour demand. If these countries enter into a recession, migration policy serves 
as a safety valve: Falling aggregate demand leads to a reduction in immigration – often through the 
bias of a more restrictive migration policy – and thus results in a lesser increase in unemployment (see 
Flückiger (1998) for a discussion of this mechanism in Switzerland). 
8
 In order to minimize the number of missing observations, we do not integrate the measures for the 
legal minimum wage, bargaining coordination and wage dispersion – three variables that seem not 
central for the explanation of low-skilled unemployment and for which we lack observations for a 
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third of the 84 country-periods. To avoid an endogeneity problem, we also leave aside the measure of 
labour migration: labour migration is probably determined by the level of low-skilled unemployment 
rather than determining it. 
9
 More plausible than expecting wage inequality to be the price to be paid for a successful service 
economy is the explanation that wage inequality simply mirrors the skill distribution of labour supply. 
Empirical enquiries into the earnings structure of the U.S. and Western Europe thus suggest that 
higher (lower) wage dispersion is the result of larger (smaller) skill differentials within the workforce 
(Nickell and Bell, 1996, Freeman and Schettkat, 2001). 
10
 Of course, a loose monetary policy and low interest rates only succeed in stimulating aggregate 
demand if credit markets are functioning. In the current 2008-2009 crisis, this is not the case. As inter-
bank lending and credit markets are frozen, interest rates set by central banks do not determine access 
to credits. 
 
 
